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Shenzhen: Urban Myth of a New Chinese City 
 
Juan Du 
The University of Hong Kong 
Proximity to Hong Kong is often cited as the main reason for the economic success of 
Shenzhen and its surrounding Pearl River Delta region.  Ironically, when Hong Kong was 
ceded by Qing Dynasty China to the British Empire in 1842, the then barren rock's 
biggest asset was its location in the Pearl River estuary, where the freshwater Pearl River 
flows into the South China Sea.  The Pearl River Delta (PRD), located in China's 
southernmost Guangdong Province, was one of Asia’s main trading ports for hundreds of 
years before the colonization of Hong Kong: there are sites within Shenzhen's urban 
territory that date to 300 C.E.  From open trade, warring concessions, collapse of the 
Qing Dynasty, to the People's Republic of China's isolationist stance and later changing 
to the Open Door Policy reforms during the 1970s and 80s, the region has undergone 
tremendous transformations.  The PRD is now home to about 45 million residents and 
currently a reported GDP of US$ 300 billion, approximately 10% of China's national 
GDP.i Certainly the PRD's rapid development since the 80s into China's major economic 
powerhouse is built upon its multifaceted economic and sociopolitical ties to Hong Kong, 
now China's Special Administrative Region since the hand-over in 1997. The creation of 
Shenzhen and other Special Economic Zones in 1979 adjacent to Hong Kong's territory 
was the first of many steps of China's experimentation with a capitalistic economy, albeit 
qualified with “socialist characteristics”.  These days proximity to Shenzhen and the rest 
of the PRD is again an adage that Hong Kong broadcasts to the world to stress its 
advantage in the global economy, releasing a hybrid label of the Greater Pearl River 
Delta. 
 
More than perhaps any other city, Shenzhen has come to represent China's rapid 
modernization and urbanization, both in the international and domestic popular 
imagineire as well as recent scholarly work on modern China. Whether touting Shenzhen 
as the first Chinese city to be based on modern planning and its successful economic 
development, or dismissing it as a capitalist sweat-shop devoid of any local character, all 
seem to insist that Shenzhen is a city with “no-history” that came from “nothing” just a 
“sleepy” “fishing village” and “rice fields” consisting of “ground zero” development and 
then transformed “overnight” into an “instant city” with “no intermediary” stages.ii 
Ironically in an age of globalization devoid of ideological and spiritual sentiments, 
Shenzhen however, is often cited as a modern miracle.  Certainly based upon all 
economic indicators and the popular visual representations, Shenzhen seems to be a city 
with standard modern qualities that transformed from the "land of fish and rice" into its 
glittering present form all within two decades.  From an urban planning point of view, 
Shenzhen's first and successive Comprehensive Master Plans are based on classical 
Soviet-influenced centrally controlled master planning. The rigid formal planning 
resulted in an essentially linear city along a single coastal transportation spine named 
Shennan Grand Boulevard. The original 1986 Master Plan of Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone planned for a population of one million by the year 2000. The 1989 
Comprehensive General Planning Modification of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone tried 
to keep up with the faster than predicted growth by changing the planning to 
accommodate for 1.5 million residents. Yet, the population of Shenzhen stood at 10 
million in 2000.iii With such discrepancies between the centrally planned economy and 
urban form with the actual conditions of the city, how did Shenzhen not only survive, but 
reached such an economic success? The answer lies in the hidden urban realities of 
densely developed informal sites dubbed Cheng Zhong Cun, or "Villages in the City".  
Take any satellite image of Shenzhen and examine areas along the very visible east-west 
transportation spine of Shennan Grand Boulevard, and you will notice that behind the 
layer of manicured roadside landscapes and towered developments there often exist 
blocks of densely packed gridded settlements. Venture inside these areas, and you 
encounter an entirely different urban condition than the typical images of Shenzhen: mid-
rise high-density buildings within breathing room of each other. (See Figure 1) The 
existing 300 or so Villages are home to nearly half of Shenzhen's population, all packed 
into a total area of less than 10% of the city's land. People usually refer to these areas as 
"slums", "red light districts", or according to Shenzhen Municipality Villages in the City 
Reformation Declaration in 2005, "ulcers in our healthy urban environment".iv Merged 
and purged from nearly 2,000 former agrarian villages that occupied the city's land prior 
to its re-birth and re-naming as Shenzhen, today there are about 300 such sites scattered 
throughout Shenzhen's commercial developments and industrial zones. In order to build 
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in 1989, the central government purchased the land 
rights from the village collectives by designating the land as urban and therefore owned 
exclusively by the central government. In exchange, each male villager received a 120m2 
parcel of land for private use to construct a new house.  Over the following years, most 
villagers constructed low-quality and low-rent housing on these square parcels of land to 
take advantage of the massive influx of migrant workers who came to Shenzhen in search 
of work. The city's economic and spatial planning simply did not predict and could not 
construct enough housing for the sudden and continuous influx of migrants. Most of the 
former farmers became landlords and developers reaping steady income from the rents 
paid by these new comers to the city. In recent years, most of the former village heads 
have become CEOs of village-collective-owned corporations that develop commercial 
properties open to the public and negotiate enormous transactions by selling the village-
collective land to private investors and developers. In addition to housing, the Villages in 
the City are choked full of street side stands, small shops, open-air markets, all night 
games parlors, and underground factories. The Villages in the City often have unlicensed 
schools, clinics and hospitals, as migrant workers and their children are usually not 
eligible for the city's public facilities.   
As the current Villages in the City are transformed from the original ‘natural villages’, 
the spatial relationships between sites are based on walking accessibility. The resulting 
urban organization is such that they are distributed throughout the city's many 
commercial centers. Most residents living in the Villages simply walk to work. With such  
inflexible linear transportation planning, having already met its capacity, it is difficult to 
imagine the consequences of all workers having to commute to work even on public 
transportation. In essence, these Villages in the City have become providers of affordable 
housing, close-knit social networks, and mixed-use developments, making up for what 
the central planning dangerously lacked: a sustainable socioeconomic urban fabric for the 
most basic forms of people’s needs. (See Figure 2)  Unquestionably the village and the 
city have always existed in codependence.  Traditionally, the interchange is agricultural 
goods for monetary compensation. Yet, under the current conditions in China, the former 
codependence has been transformed into an unprecedented exchange and confrontation of 
complex social, economic, and political relationships. Discourse on modern China cannot 
ignore the massive floating rural population living and working within the city: the total 
number of the floating migrant population nationwide is estimated at 200 million, or a 
full 15% of China's total population. Exploration of the new Chinese city must also 
examine the social, economic, and political relationships between the Village and the 
City. In most Chinese cities today, the most basic needs – from shelter construction to 
food preparation – are met by migrant workers with no official status in the cities.  This 
current phenomenon of inter-dependency between village and city is perhaps the most 
extreme in the case of Shenzhen. Demonizing these Villages in the City as "ulcers" and 
dismissing the unique history of Shenzhen as a whole is a gross oversight of a powerfully 
unique urbanization process. Not recognizing the historical significance of Shenzhen’s 
past and present would lead to a missed opportunity to learn from such a sweeping, 
although unplanned, urban experimentation at a massive scale.  Shenzhen, examined as 
China's accidental invention toward a radical hybrid urban structure could serve as a 
conceptual model for sustainable urban development in the Greater Pearl River Delta 
region and around the world. 
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i Statistics based on official Yearbooks published at the National and Province level.  However one 
characteristic of China's population and economic data is that they are not verifiable.  For the purposes of 
this essay, they are ensured enough accuracy to give a correct understanding of the economic context. 
 
ii Words in quotations are common descriptors of Shenzhen in almost all writings on the City.  I have noted 
one specific example in previous writing.  Juan Du,  “Don’t Underestimate the Rice Fields,” in Urban 
Transformations (Berlin: Ruby Press, 2008) 
 
iii Planning History of Shenzhen, Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau published pamphlets, 2005-2008.  Also 
refer to the official website of the Shenzhen Planning Bureau, in Chinese at 
http://www.szplan.gov.cn/main/index.shtml. 
 
iv The government’s changing positions in regard to the Villages in the City are outlined in more details in 
my text “Don’t Underestimate the Rice Fields,” in Urban Transformations (Berlin: Ruby Press, 2008). 
